There are three types of financial swaps: foreign currency swaps, interest rate swaps, and equity swaps. 10 As evidenced simply by the sheer number of derivatives within the swap category, the financial realm of derivatives can be confusing and tedious. In recognition of that complexity, this Note focuses solely on interest rate swaps to illustrate the overall applicability of a frustration of purpose cause of action.
B. An Overview of Interest Rate Swaps: One of the Most Common Forms of Derivatives
An interest rate swap involves two parties exchanging interest rate streams from two separate debt instruments. 11 For example, if "Business A" needs to obtain capital, they may sell a debt bond and receive capital at a floating interest rate. The prospect of maintaining a floating rate on the loaned principal obviously creates a certain risk to Business A, so it may 385, 387 (1992) . Note that in addition to two party swaps, there are also three party swaps involving a bank as an intermediary between the other two parties. For simplification purposes, this example is portrayed as a two-party swap. [Vol. 24:2 amount of principal tied to an individual term likely will vary and can be used as a strategic means for one party or the other to project which periods might bring higher reward for that party.
20
To clarify the transaction, an injection of numbers into the hypothetical is helpful. 21 First, Business A takes out a corporate bond for $100 at the floating Corporate Bond Rate from "Bank 2." Next, Bank 1 and Business A agree to use LIBOR as the index rate. It is crucial to recognize that LIBOR (or the chosen index rate) must track the Corporate Bond Rate very closely to effectively allow for Business A to hedge its interest risks. Bank 1 provides Business A with a fixed rate of 5 percent for each of four terms. Each term will relate to twenty-five dollars of the principal and will be spaced evenly throughout the duration of the loan. At the end of the first term, LIBOR happens to be 4 percent. What this means is that Bank 1 has won this term, and Business A will make a twenty-five cent payment to Bank 1. 22 At the end of the second term, LIBOR ends at 7 percent. That would mean that Business A has won this term, and Bank 1 will make a fifty cent payment to Business A. 23 The last two terms will operate in the same manner, with the LIBOR rate ending above the fixed rate as a win for Business A and the LIBOR rate ending below the fixed rate as a win for Bank 1. This works as a hedge for Business A in this way: if LIBOR rises to 10 percent for a term, then in a properly functioning swap, the Corporate Bond Rate will be right around 10 percent as well. Business A will receive a payment from Bank 1 roughly equivalent to what it must pay for that term of the bond to the original lending institution, Bank 2; thus, Business A approximately breaks even or hedges its risk.
If LIBOR falls to 2 percent for a term, then in a properly functioning swap, the Corporate Bond Rate will be right around 2 percent as well. Business A will pay Bank 1 roughly the equivalent to the amount it would have had to pay to Bank 2 as interest on the Corporate Bond Rate had it been equal to the fixed rate at 5 percent. In this way, Business A effectively pays 5 percent interest regardless of the way LIBOR moves; the variable within the transaction is whether Bank 1 is paying for any excess interest over 5 percent during that term or whether Business A is paying Bank 1 for 20 . Molony, supra note 4. 21. Once again, the author acknowledges that this hypothetical and the numbers presented suffer from simplicity; however, the necessary functions of the interest rate swaps for purposes of this Note are highlighted in order to allow application of the frustration of purpose doctrine. 
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a reduction in the interest rate below 5 percent. Theoretically, Bank 1 will enter into interest rate swap transactions in which it believes Business A will end up paying the difference between the LIBOR rate and the fixed rate (i.e. when LIBOR falls below the fixed rate) more often than it will have to pay the difference to Business A (i.e. when LIBOR rises above the fixed rate). For Business A, it can calculate a reasonably fixed cost for the bond, which allows better budgeting and financial planning: when adding what it receives from or pays to Bank 1 with what it owes Bank 2 on the Corporate Bond Rate, it should come out to approximately a 5 percent total interest payment.
C. An Overview of The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008
The global financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 created a "fundamental disruption" and a "financial upheaval" that "wreaked havoc in communities and neighborhoods across the country." 24 Since then, there has been much debate amongst politicians, academics, and the general populous concerning who exactly is at fault for the meltdown. 25 The government-created Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission made a determination in 2011 that it was indeed a combination of factors amalgamating to create the drastic effect. Amongst these factors were the practice of shadow banking, the increase in securitization and derivatives, the deregulation of the financial and banking industries, and increases in subprime lending. 26 Of importance to this Note is the "conclu[sion that] over the counter derivatives contributed significantly to th[e] crisis," and an understanding of how the downturn directly affected interest rate swaps in a significant way. 28 These index rate drops turned the interest rate swaps into consistent losers for the parties who had the fixed rate, as each term ended with the LIBOR or the index rate below the fixed rates. 29 The inverted effect of this was a windfall for the institutions holding the floating rate. 30 However, the loss by the fixed rate holders due to the hedging was a foreseeable risk that those parties had knowingly taken on as part of their agreement. What was not foreseen and what caused these holders to lose on a much larger scale was the divergence of the Corporate Bond Rate and the LIBOR rate. 31 Recall that a basic assumption for the effectiveness of an interest rate swap as a hedge is that the indexing rate, such as LIBOR, and the Corporate Bond Rate will track one another; that did not happen during the financial crisis.
32 Instead, the company had to pay the historic difference between the low indexing rate and the unmoving fixed rate to the bank-in the previous example, Bank 1-as part of the swap agreement.
33 But in addition, the company had to pay a large amount to the holder of the bond-in the previous example, Bank 2-at the Corporate Bond Rate since the Corporate Bond Rate increased or held steady, and the indexing rate plummeted; the companies stuck in these transactions were paying two parties and effectively there was no hedge. 34 Recalling the example used previously with Business A, Bank 1, and Bank 2, it is once again easier to visualize the loss of a hedge with numerical values. As a reminder, assume that Business A pays a fixed rate set at 5 percent to Bank 1. For this example, Business A's corporate bond is $100 and the Corporate Bond Rate is tied to the Federal Funds Rate, while the indexing rate is LIBOR. Finally, recall that LIBOR and the Corporate Bond Rate or here, the Federal Funds Rate set by the Federal Reserve, need to track. Assume for the first twenty-five-dollar term, the LIBOR rate is 4 percent, the Corporate Bond Rate is 4.25 percent, and the fixed rate is the standard 5 percent; for this term, Business A makes a $0.25 payment to Bank 1 and must pay Bank 2 $1.06. 35 Under these conditions, the hedge Under these conditions, the hedge has failed and Business A must pay 6.52 percent for this term instead of their fixed 5 percent. For this transaction, it may not seem like much of a difference; however, for a larger dollar volume corporate bond and over the course of multiple terms, this higher payment could be a large blow for a business. Moving on to the third term, assume that conditions continue to deteriorate and LIBOR has fallen to 1 percent while the Corporate Bond Rate falls to 3.25 percent; although both rates have fallen, the difference between the rates has increased even more. In this term, the hedge has failed again and Business A must pay Bank 1 $1.00 and must pay Bank 2 $0.81. 37 The total rate paid for the term is 7.24 percent. In the fourth term, assume that the LIBOR rate fell to 0.5 percent and the corporate bond rate fell to 3 percent. For this term, Business A owes Bank 1 $1.12 and Bank 2 $0.75, for a total payment of $1.87 and a total rate of 7.48 percent. After the divergence between the Corporate Bond Rates and LIBOR, entities attempted to recover from their drastic losses. They began by attempting to bring lawsuits against the banks, but they ran up against the built-in legal safeguards of the standardized ISDA agreements they had signed. 42 The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) standardized the form of swap agreements in an attempt to reduce disputes and transaction costs associated with the deals. 43 However, the ISDA agreement is only one of three parts of an agreement, the other two being the Schedule and the Confirmation Letter. 44 These three documents combined tend to insulate the banks from claims after a loss occurs, as they include many waivers on the part of the entity entering into the deals with the banks. 45 Furthermore, a large majority of American litigation in the derivatives arena falls under the jurisdiction of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York and New York state law as a result of the form documents offered by the banks. 
a. Lack of Authority or Agency
One of the more common claims brought in attempts to invalidate swap agreements, at least initially, was that the execution on the part of the company was performed with a lack of authority or agency. In such cases, the customer claims that the employee or employees who entered into the transaction did not have the corporate authority to engage in that level of decision-making. 47 The claim relies on "the assertion that the employee was somehow a renegade and the corporation was unaware of what was actually 40 48 However, these claims were not widely successful due to the doctrine of apparent authority, which places liability on a company or employer that gives a false impression that the employee engaged in the transaction does have the authority to execute the deal; it is a theory that promotes reasonable reliance on a person's authority when he or she purports to be a decision maker. 49 For apparent authority to not apply in such a situation, the facts would require a person of questionable authority involved in the transaction to begin with, which is not likely considering the impliedly important nature of these hedging techniques.
50
As a typical example of how US courts deal with agency claims in this context, Ables & Hall Builders (Ables) attempted to avoid its losses due to interest rate swaps by claiming a lack of authority to enter the agreement. 51 Ables had entered into a swap with US Bank National Association, which brought a breach of contract action to enforce the payment terms of the swap against Ables. 52 As a defense against enforcement, Ables claimed that Darlene, a bookkeeper, did not have authority to bind the company with the interest rate swap transaction yet proceeded to sign the Master Agreement and Schedule. 53 The bank realized a while later that Darlene had not been authorized to sign on behalf of Ables, and it contacted Ables to have the contract officially executed. 54 Eventually, Ables consented to sign the forms again; however, there was some question as to whether management fully understood the agreement. 55 The court found that, by performing under the contract for over three years after execution, Ables had ratified the agreement in terms of agency law.
56
The court did not discuss whether Darlene may have had apparent authority. 57 This case emphasizes the struggle an entity has in utilizing this legal defense against enforcement. Even if the court somehow determines that there was a lack of apparent authority on the part of an employee, the barrier of ratification by performance makes this legal tool virtually obsolete in instances where the transaction has already begun.
b. Fraud
In addition to agency claims, entities trying to recover from interest 48 rate swaps gone wrong have attacked the formation of the transaction, saying that the bank either engaged in fraud or a negligent misrepresentation. The fraud claims are highly case-specific and can become very complex to resolve in the derivatives context. 58 Because of the relatively difficult and complicated nature of derivatives, it can be difficult to prove that a misunderstanding, on the part of a business entity, was a material misstatement made by the bank. 59 Businesses have attempted to assert fraud in everything from a misrepresentation of the nature of the risks involved to a misrepresentation of the value of the derivatives.
60
Even in a less financially volatile time with fewer claims, American courts have not given much heed to fraud arguments relating to interest rate swaps. In Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., an Ohio federal court held that a transaction for interest rate swaps did not constitute fraud. 61 Procter & Gamble (P & G) argued that Bankers Trust Co. (BT) had represented to them, through advertisements and presentations, that they would be using expertise in the area to advise them in the complex area of derivatives. 62 The court found that BT was not acting for or on behalf of P & G as that relationship is generally construed in the customer-broker context. As counterparties, P & G and BT were principals in a bilateral contractual arrangement. This is not to say that BT had no duties to P & G. The Fifth Circuit's opinion further cemented the trouble in overcoming the burden of proving fraud when it mentioned that the language contained in the ISDA Master Agreement makes it difficult to prove the justifiable reliance prong. 66 Although as a general rule fraud claims have not found much success in this arena, most parties seeking to recover for losses on interest rate swaps bring a fraud claim since the facts of the individual case could potentially bring a different outcome. 
c. Negligent Misrepresentation
Though closely related to fraud, negligent misrepresentation claims are a slightly different method of approaching recovery from a losing interest rate swap. In order to succeed on a negligent misrepresentation claim, an injured plaintiff must show the defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff. 68 In a commercial context, such as that of the derivatives market, the defendant must possess some form of expertise or be in a position of trust with the injured party such that reliance on the defendant's negligent misrepresentation was warranted. 69 Typically, those entities bringing negligent misrepresentation claims allege that the marketing campaign of the financial institution has portrayed the transaction in a simpler and less risky manner than is appropriate; this is despite the typical contractual language in which the business agrees that it is fully informed of what it is entering into and discloses the potential for financial loss. 70 Furthermore, "[t]he law of negligent misrepresentation is more complex than that of fraud and generates some additional difficulties in derivatives disputes." 71 A similar but subtly different corollary to this argument has come more recently in the form of attempts to void the transactions as an equitable remedy due to the LIBOR-rigging scandal occurring at the same time that banks were still selling and marketing interest-rate swaps. Under this theory, a party often claims that the banks were negligently misrepresenting 65 Cases previous to the financial crisis demonstrated that negligent misrepresentation claims were not likely to get past the safeguards of ISDA. Additionally, the barrier of a counterparty relationship between the banks and those entering the transaction with them and a difficulty in proving statements that constitute a negligent misrepresentation combine to largely discount this cause of action. 73 After the crisis, there was little to no change in this outcome. 74 Additionally, statute of limitations issues add another obstacle to recovery under negligent misrepresentation. 75 The court in Yountville Investors, LLC v. Bank of America, N.A. provides an opinion demonstrating the difficulty parties have in bringing negligent misrepresentation claims. 76 After their interest rate swap cost Yountville Investors dearly, they brought several claims for declaratory relief, restitution, and damages. 77 Yountville alleged "defendant possesse[d] 'unique and specialized expertise and superior knowledge with respect to interest swap agreements [,] ' and therefore had a duty to disclose any profit it would realize on entering the agreement, as well as to 'correctly represent the manner and method by which it calculated any termination amount.'" 78 The court, however, dismissed the claim saying, Even viewing the facts alleged by plaintiff in the most favorable light, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to allege either a relationship that is in any way distinct from that between a "plain-vanilla" borrower and lender, or a duty of care arising from any source external to the swap agreement. The law does not impose liability for negligent 72 In general, negligent misrepresentation claims for interest rate swaps end up meeting the same end as most other traditional claims brought against the behemoth that is the financial system and its built-in legal protections.
The Effect on Interest Rate Swaps in the United Kingdom: A Similar Divergence Issue Overseas
The effects of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 were not isolated to the United States of America. 80 When the US government allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to fail in September of 2008, the crisis came to a global head; for a period, every bank was considered to be risky. 81 Shortly thereafter, there were legitimate fears of a global financial domino effect; this fear forced western governments to serve as capital life support for many of their banks in order to avoid collapse. 82 It is in this financial background that interest rate swaps became losing transactions in the United Kingdom just as they had in the United States. 83 In England alone, an estimated 28,000 interest rate swaps were sold to small businesses between the years of 2001 and 2007. 87 The second aspect that separates the legal ramifications of the global financial crisis on interest rate swaps in the United Kingdom versus the United States is the judicial handling of claims for restitution or rescission since the crisis. In the United Kingdom, it is possible such claims are more likely to succeed due to both the rise of mis-selling claims after the LIBOR scandal has come to light 88 and the Financial Services Authority (FSA) process for payouts to uninformed purchasers of the swaps. 
The Legal Ramifications in the United

a. The Hazell Decision and its Fortunate Consequences
Although both businesses and local governments have utilized interest rate swaps as a funding mechanism in the United States, the Hazell case in 1991 removed local governments from the market in the United Kingdom. The decision would seem a fortuitous piece of foresight after the global financial crisis turned several swap transactions into toxic losers. In Hazell, the Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council ceased making payments toward the interest rate swaps they had entered into. 90 At the time, this was the largest default on an interest rate swap transaction in history.
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The Local Government Act of 1972 divided England into counties, districts, London boroughs, and parishes; it also created the Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council and other similar local bodies. 92 The authority of these local bodies was circumscribed by the 1972 Act specifically limiting the purpose and methods of borrowing for local authorities. 93 The Council entered into several interest rate swaps through 
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the years in an attempt to correctly predict the rise or fall of interest rates and earn a profit on the transactions in order to apply the earnings to the interest of their borrowing. 94 On January 24, 1991, the House of Lords determined all of the Council's interest rate swaps were illegal and invalid. 95 The court interpreted the 1972 Act to not include interest rate swaps as an ancillary or incidental function of the Council's borrowing power. 96 As a result of the swap transactions being ultra vires, the Council was excused from making its contractually obligated payments of $843.5 million to $1.012 billion to the banks with which it had entered into the transactions. 97 Despite the immediate impact of the Council's ability to excuse payment, there was a much broader and longer-lasting effect stemming from the Hazell decision. There were two central consequences arising from the decision. First, the local authorities in the United Kingdom no longer entered into interest rate swaps. 98 This would be important a decade and a half later when English local authorities and institutions watched as their US counterparts suffered through bankruptcy or financial stress nearing bankruptcy as a result of toxic swaps. 99 The second, more chaotic action was a "triggering of a rash of litigation." 100 Once the Hazell decision came down, it unraveled hundreds of other transactions entered into by other local authorities as ultra vires. 101 Overall, the central effect of the Hazell decision on the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 was that when the crisis hit, some local governments in the US were damaged severely by holding interest rate swaps while the local authorities in the United [Vol. 24:2 Kingdom had been banned from entering such arrangements since 1991.
b. The Rise of Mis-Selling Claims
More recently, the divergence between the handling of interest rate swap disputes in the United Kingdom and the United States has increased with the prevalence of what the British financial world has dubbed "misselling." 102 The reason behind the term is the idea that the banks selling and marketing the transactions did not make clear the consequences of a drop in one of the tracking rates more than the other, and that they had not revealed initially the penalty-sized termination fees in the event the company needed to end the contract early. 103 Though nominally different, the claim for misselling closely mirrors the American common law negligent misrepresentation or fraud claims. 104 A stark difference is the general success realized by British companies in bringing these claims versus their American counterparts.
With claims for mis-selling from all forms and sizes of businesses, the FSA 105 has taken on the task of sifting through the interest rate swap swamp in the United Kingdom. It is easiest to sort the mis-selling claims into two categories: those utilizing the LIBOR-rigging scandal as a central part of the mis-selling argument and those claims not necessarily focused on the LIBOR-rigging scandal. It is important to note that both of these areas of British law are rapidly changing as multitudes of these claims are raised, judicially or administratively determined, or settled virtually daily.
106
The claims of mis-selling made without a focus on the LIBOR scandal have been relatively successful depending on the business bringing the claim. In 2012 the large public concern in the United Kingdom over the havoc interest rate swaps had wreaked on small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) culminated in a review of the transactions by the 112 In that case, the court held that the contract forming the interest rate swaps precluded a mis-selling claim, similar to the results in American courts; this left Grant Estates, Ltd. solely with a remedy through the agreements between the FSA and the banks for restitution.
113
Although it was clear that the banks would be compensating SMEs for the mis-selling of interest rate swaps, as of January 31, 2013, there was not an established method or calculation of how the payments were to be made or administered, though payments under non-terminated agreements had been suspended. 114 Additionally, there were certain specifications for the SMEs that would be eligible under the agreements. Originally, the FSA determined only businesses with less than £6.5 million of sales, fewer than fifty employees, or assets worth less than £3.26 million would be eligible. 115 The purpose of this classification was to hopefully capture only the subset of businesses that were non-sophisticated and would not be likely to have understood the full financial complexities of an interest rate swap. 116 Inversely, the FSA did not want to bail out companies that had the financial complexity and capacity to understand the risky transaction they were entering. 117 However, the FSA soon realized that this was an oversimplification and that categorizing businesses in this way did not best 107 118 An example of this strict categorization would be a company that operated a seasonal business and had more than fifty employees due to a large amount of work in a small amount of time; more specifically, an institution like a bed and breakfast 119 or a small orchard might be classified as complex enough to understand the inner-workings of an interest rate swap.
120 From a policy-perspective, the FSA knew it must change course; the exact nature of this change in categorization is still being contemplated as of the writing of this Note. 121 Furthermore, there has been much debate on how those SMEs qualifying for the FSA agreement with the banks will be compensated. The FSA has made a general statement expressing that redress for mis-selling of interest rate swaps "should aim to put customers back in the position they would have been in, had the breach of regulatory requirements not occurred."
122 The company must demonstrate it would not have purchased an interest rate swap had the bank not mis-sold in order to receive full compensation or that it would have purchased a different product for partial compensation.
123 Those aspects of compensation may seem straightforward, but many SMEs also desire compensation for consequential damages stemming from their toxic swap contracts. Some of the claims for consequential damages include requests for compensation due to laying off employees, selling off assets, overdrafting charges, or additional borrowing costs; termination fees are typically considered to be a direct damage from the swap transactions. 124 At this stage, it is unclear exactly how the consequential damages will factor into redress for mis-selling. 125 By excluding larger, more complex companies from utilizing the FSA agreement with the banks, the FSA prompted a new type of mis-selling claim; one that focuses on the artificial deflation of the LIBOR rate during the global financial crisis. At the time of the writing of this Note, it is not exactly clear how the courts in the United Kingdom will handle mis-selling cases in which the impropriety of LIBOR depression by the bank involved in the transaction is utilized as a justification for restitution. However, there are indications that the banks are concerned with what the future might hold. For example, Barclays set aside $1.6 billion for legal costs it anticipated for mis-selling claims as of February 5, 2013-including a large portion not allocated for forced payments through its agreement with the 
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FSA to restore SMEs to pre-swap position. 126 Additionally, UBS reported that it had spent $2 billion on legal fees in 2012; this included $1.5 billion in fines for its role in the LIBOR-rigging scandal in addition to fighting other legal battles related to the scandal. 127 One final demonstration of how large banks might fear legal precedent for LIBOR-rigging claims is The Royal Bank of Scotland, which settled for £25 million with businessman David Agar over his interest rate swap claims.
III. THE CARNAGE: REAL EXAMPLES OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL DESTRUCTION DUE TO TOXIC INTEREST RATE SWAPS
It is difficult to overstate the devastating financial consequences the crisis in 2007 and 2008 and the conditions that followed have had on businesses, local governments, and other "fixed rate" holders of derivatives, most specifically interest rate swaps. Jefferson County in Alabama, which contains the city of Birmingham, underwent the largest municipal bankruptcy on record due to its derivatives used to finance sewage improvements in 2008. 129 Boston University suffered at the hand of interest rate swaps to the tune of a net operating loss of $162.6 million for fiscal year 2011; this forced the university to ready and liquidate $200 million in the event that it had to cancel the transactions and pay termination fees.
130
Even worse was neighboring Harvard University, whose interest rate swaps became so toxic that it was willing to terminate them at a fee of around $1 billion. 131 Businesses from Wisconsin's Metavante, which supplied financial technology services and software to the British Chinese restaurant chain Hakkasan, lost considerable amounts of money on interest rate swaps. 132 It was under this climate of financial annihilation and loss that disenchanted and disgruntled entities brought legal claims attempting to [Vol. 24:2 recover anything they could get their hands on.
IV. THE FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE DOCTRINE: A SEEMINGLY INAPPLICABLE APPLICATION
A. The Tests for Frustration of Purpose: A Common Law Defense to Enforcement
As a relatively rare common law defense to enforcement, frustration of purpose may seem like an unlikely theory to enter the complicated and complex derivatives market as a savior for holders of toxic swaps. However, applying the facts of the recent and unprecedented global financial crisis within the interest rate swap context to a frustration scenario, it actually makes quite a bit of sense as a claim against enforcement.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that the frustration of purpose doctrine applies:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
133
The rationale behind this defense to enforcement of a contract is to protect a party when the other party's performance becomes virtually worthless due to something unforeseen to either party prior to agreeing to the deal. 134 It is crucial first that the purpose being frustrated was the principal purpose or consideration of the contract; in other words, without the existence of the frustrated portion of the contract, the transaction would have made little sense. 135 Additionally, the frustration must not be slight; rather, it must be of a substantial nature. 136 Finally, the non-occurrence of the frustrating event must have been so strongly assumed that it was a basic assumption upon which the contract was made.
137
In essence, the doctrine of frustration of purpose is a judicially imposed condition on all contracts that both parties agree at the time of contracting that either party will be excused from performance if the conditions change in a way unforeseen to either party in a way relating to 133 
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something that is a fundamental basis of the deal. 138 In order for frustration of purpose to apply, the value of the parties' performance must be completely or almost completely abrogated by the frustrating event.
139 The rationale behind the foreseeability requirement is that if the occurrence of the frustrating event is reasonably foreseeable, then the parties to the contract should have negotiated terms addressing the potential occurrence of the event and indicating which party would bear the burden or risk of its occurrence.
140 Furthermore, the general view amongst the legal community is that " [t] he doctrine of commercial frustration should be limited in its application and narrowly applied to preserve the certainty of contracts."
141
B. The Beginning of the Frustration of Purpose Doctrine: A Cancelled Parade
The history of the frustration of purpose doctrine in both America and the United Kingdom actually took root in the same decision. Krell v. Henry is the archetypal case for frustration of purpose and finds itself in most firstyear contract law courses. 142 In Krell, the two parties to the lawsuit had entered into a contract in which Mr. Henry would rent Mr. Krell's apartment for two days. 143 Though not expressed in the language of the contract, the principal purpose of the rental was for Mr. Henry to view the coronation parade of the King from Krell's balcony apartment. 144 The intent behind the renting was evidenced by the short term of the rental and the fact that the "price to be paid . . . was fixed with reference to the expected procession"-in other words, at a much higher price than would typically be the case. 145 When it came time for the parade, the King fell ill and the parade did not take place as planned. 146 Mr. Henry refused to pay for the room as the contract required, and this suit commenced.
147
The court ultimately held that Mr. Henry did not have to pay for the room as agreed upon in the contract. 148 The court set the following parameters for determining whether frustration of purpose should excuse enforcement of a contract:
Each case must be judged by its own circumstances. In When applying the facts of the case to that framework, the court determined that the basis of the contract was to rent the room in order to view the coronation. 150 The non-occurrence of the coronation prevented the performance of the contract in that the bargained-for consideration was no longer in existence. 151 Finally, the event frustrating the agreement, or the cancellation of the coronation, was not something the parties would have reasonably foreseen when agreeing to the terms of the contract; in other words, there was a presumption by both parties that the procession would occur and the non-occurrence was reasonably determined to be so unlikely that the contract did not specifically state that the contract was conditioned on the occurrence of the coronation.
152
C. The Current Relevance of the Frustration of Purpose Doctrine
Frustration of purpose is generally rare as an affirmative defense to the enforcement of a contract. It does, however, have a contemporary application, 153 especially within the confines of New York state law, which governs most interest rate swaps under ISDA form agreements. There are many different types of contracts in which performance is excused under frustration of purpose, and even seemingly complex business and financial contracts between seemingly knowledgeable and experienced parties can result in frustration of purpose. 154 The particular context is of little importance; rather, as long as the elements for frustration of purpose are present, the defense to enforcement is valid.
In the court has the opportunity to provide a more clear answer as to whether the claim is sufficient to pass stricter scrutiny than a mere motion to dismiss.
V. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
The global financial crisis fundamentally changed the LIBOR rate and the range in which it generally cycles. 205 Years later, it has come to light that the international banking community may have colluded to artificially depress this rate. 206 At the same time, many businesses found ever rising Corporate Bond Rates. Ultimately, the businesses were paying twice on their loans: once for the differences between LIBOR and the fixed rate in their interest rate swaps to the banks and once for the differences between LIBOR and the Corporate Bond Rate to the loaning parties on their bond transactions. 207 The Corporate Bond Rate was so much higher than LIBOR that at a point, the consideration for the interest rate swaps initially-the hedging-was no longer functioning.
208
It is yet to be determined whether the courts will generally recognize the validity of the commercial frustration of purpose defense to interest rate swaps. To this point, the cases have settled or been withdrawn before a verdict has been handed down. This, however, may not change anytime soon. If banks determine that they do not want to risk the chance that this defense becomes precedential, then they may settle when parties bring this cause of action. A separate dimension to this claim is the statute of limitations. Since commercial frustration of purpose is a common law contract defense, its statute of limitations might follow the same track, which could be six years, for example. The issue to be settled would be whether the frustration occurs at one point in time or whether it is a continuous frustration; that finding would be crucial to determine when the statute of limitations begins tolling. With a six-year statute of limitations, it is possible that time is running short for many parties looking to make a recovery from a deal in place during 2007 and 2008. At the same time, it is possible that with the now-recognizable risk that the floating interest rate indexes might diverge, a party could succeed by arguing that there is a continuous frustration of purpose for the transaction; the transaction had lost its hedging capability at any moment within a certain time frame.
In addition to the concerns surrounding the statute of limitations running out on transactions in place during the global financial crisis, there 
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are also questions about damage calculations if the claims succeed. One possibility is that courts would place parties in the positions they were in previous to entering into the agreement. Another possibility is that the termination fee would be the only portion included in recovery. It is unlikely that a court would award consequential damages due to the general reluctance to award these in most circumstances; however, the consequential damages have been extensive in some instances. For example, if a company became financially strapped, it might have taken out an additional loan to cover the interest rate payments. There is an endless list of damages one can think of being caused by a massive and unexpected cost of doing business. As with statute of limitation issues, the damage calculation might turn on the exact moment the swap's purpose was frustrated. Overall though, one would think that many of the businesses affected by the toxic interest rate swaps will likely accept any relief they can recover within reason at this point. Factoring in the unresolved issues of statutes of limitations, damage calculations, and the other complexities of unraveling a detailed financial derivative, this Note contends that from a purely legal perspective, interest rate swaps operating during the global financial crisis and tied to floating rates that diverged like LIBOR and the Federal Funds Rate should be held unenforceable under the frustration of purpose doctrine. It should be noted that this argument is more relevant currently for the American legal system. In the United Kingdom, many of the losers from interest rate swaps have been afforded restitution either through the FSA agreement with the banks, or through the still-pending decisions on whether LIBOR-rigging banks will be punished for selling interest rate swaps at the same time. In America, however, the companies and local governments who have lost in their interest rate swap transaction can really only hold out hope for success through the frustration of purpose doctrine.
Given the background information regarding the legal theory of frustration of purpose provided earlier in this Note, there are three chief reasons why the doctrine should successfully be applied to interest rate swaps during the global financial crisis. As an aside, one can assume with rather inarguable certainty that the only contested element of the frustration of purpose argument in this context is that of reasonable foreseeability. The principal purpose, or the hedging function, was substantially frustrated without any doubt. The individual institution entering into the interest rate swap did not have any way of being at fault for the loss of the hedging. The remaining question is whether the loss of a hedging function was an event the non-occurrence of which the parties had assumed at the time of the transaction. It is this question that can be answered with three contentions. The first is that the non-occurrence of the loss of hedging was unforeseen due to the unprecedented magnitude of the global financial crisis. The second is that it was unforeseen that many of the largest lenders in the world would artificially manipulate the LIBOR rate. Third, it was not [Vol. 24:2 foreseeable that the American federal government would move the Federal Funds Rate to an astonishingly low rate and choose to bail out the financial institutions and banks with drastic consequences for small businesses and local or small government institutions.
The global financial crisis was both unexpected and unexpected in extent. It was not foreseeable that the global economy would crash, nor that rates that had historically tracked very closely would suddenly diverge exponentially. Typically, the indexes would vary by between zero and .25%, with rare occurrences of divergences of more than that. However, during the Financial Crisis, the divergence reached new heights. It is safe to say that an unprecedented event, rivaling only the Great Depression, would not have been planned for in the interest rate swap contracts. Neither party to the transaction would have reasonably believed it necessary to include language for the occurrence of such a crisis. The clearest way to prove the assertion that the contracts for interest rate swaps were founded on the basis that the hedging function would not fail due to a divergence in the floating rates stems from the fact that the transactions were entered into to begin with; why would a company or local government enter into a hedging transaction geared toward avoiding risk with knowledge that it was potentially increasing its interest rate exposure with a rate divergence?
Although artificial depression of the LIBOR rates would not have increased the divergence between the floating rates once the Federal Reserve began lowering the Federal Funds rate, the manipulation of one of the floating rates exposed the hedge to a new risk. The hedging of interest rate exposure was substantially frustrated-there was a great unforeseen risk once the banks began illegally controlling the rate-and the hedging function was no longer a reasonably secure hedge. The "LIBOR Market" was not a true reflection of the rate at which the banks were able to borrow. What made the LIBOR manipulation egregious was that many of the same banks illegally deflating the LIBOR rate were also selling and marketing interest rate swaps as properly functioning hedging mechanisms. If they sold the swaps while LIBOR was deflated artificially, they knew or should have known that there was a chance the rate would return to an accurate rate and then the divergence in floating rates would increase; this would, of course, destroy the hedging function of the interest rate swaps they had sold while the rate was depressed. The LIBOR manipulators were an unbargained-for variable in the interest rate swap transactions; it was not foreseeable that banks would illegally cause the hedging functions of these contracts to fail.
Finally, it was not foreseeable that the Federal Reserve would historically and precipitously reduce the Federal Funds Rate in an attempt to stave off the economic downturn. In response to the global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve precipitously lowered the Federal Funds Rate to zero percent, where it has remained since. The issue with that is the rate had been around four percent before the crisis hit. As the Federal Funds Rate 2014] THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS 459 plummeted, there was not a chance that LIBOR would be able to keep up in its fall for swaps tied between these two rates; the result was a large divergence and a frustration of the hedging purpose in many interest rate swaps. Even if one were to argue that a global financial crisis was a foreseeable event at the time of entering the swaps, it would be difficult to say that in the event of such a crisis, the Federal Reserve would allow the Federal Funds Rate to drop so low and at such a quick pace. Although the arguments against frustration of purpose as applied to interest rate swaps during the global financial crisis should not succeed, it is interesting to analyze the failures of the swaps. The main contention is that the presumed knowledge and expertise of the entities agreeing to the swaps with the banks demonstrates foreseeability. In other words, the complexity of the organizations entering into the swaps indicated that they knew or should have known that the interest rates might not track. However, this presumes too much. Just because a business or its decision makers might have complex and advanced knowledge of banking or business, that does not mean that they would know about the inner-workings of interest rate swaps. Even if they did know how the swaps worked, historic numbers demonstrated that the tracking would not fail.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall, it may be that many types of interest rate swaps will become a derivative dinosaur and claims for recovery will be irrelevant. However, the entities still suffering from the effects of the swaps during the global financial crisis are searching for recovery and restitution now. As a legal theory for unwinding interest rate swaps, the frustration of purpose doctrine only suffers from its unusual position in the realm of a complex global financial market, a stigma that may give pause to courts that have consistently held for the large financial institutions and the formal ISDA contracts. For the time being, whether in the United Kingdom or the United States, there are questions unanswered as to whether there is a road to recovery from the grand losers of the global financial crisis.
